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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 16200

GLORIA DANKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NA'l'URE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by jnformation with the
crime of tampering with a witness in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-508, 1953 as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried in the Fourth District Court
in Uintah County before a jury on October 11, 1978, and
was found guilty as charged.

On November 4, 1978, the

Honorable George E. Balliff sentenced appellant to a term
in the Utah Stute Prison of 0 to S years and ordered the
appellant to pay a fine of $250.00.

Execution of the sentence

was suspended on,l aprellant was placed on probation for a period
by the S.J.
oi Sponsored
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R~LIEF

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower

court's action in the disposition of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Early in the morning of August 6, 1978, the

appellant called the Vernal City Police and asked them to
to her home in Vernal (T. at 57).

Two patrol cars responded.

When the officers arrived, they found appellant and a Mr.
Kenneth D'Anza yelling at each other on the front porch
(T. at 171.

When D'Anza went to leave, appellant directed

the officers to stop him.

The officers questioned why and

appellant replied, "I have caught him in bed with my
daughter.

I

(T. at 18).

believe he has had sex with my daughter."
The officers immediately arrested Mr. D'Anza

and took appellant and her daughter to a hospital to be
examined (T. at 19).
On the way to the hospital, the appellant
instructed her daughter to, "Tell the officer what
happened.

co~

Be truthful about what happened."

The child

stated that Nr. D'Anza had "stuck: his pee-pee in her bum
hole, and his finger in her pee-pee."

(T.

at 19).

Detective Robert Downard of the Vernal City
Police Depurtment mel app,•llil.nt at the hospital and
began an investigation of th~ incirlcnt.

He stated:
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I told her (appellant) that Mr.
D'Anza would be charged with this;
that the investigation was continuing,
and that I would be to her residence
sometime on Monday to review the crime
scene.
T. 'at 24.

The following Monday, August 7th, Detective Downard visited
appellant's house and told her that a forcible sodomy
investigation was in progress and that her daughter was an
integral part of the case.

He stated on cross-examination:

I believe she even asked me if
her daughter would have to testify and
I indicated yes.
Later that afternoon, appellant took her children
to the Vernal Family Health Center for an additional
examination (T. at 34).

While she was there, she was

informed that her daughter Rayna (the victim in the sodomy
investigation) was to be placed in temporary shelter care by
the Division of Family Services (T.at 35).

Appellant then

indicated to the police that they no longer had a case;
"that she had instructed her daughter not to testify against
Kenneth D'Anza; and that she had also told her never to
talk to any more police officers about this case."
(T. at 35).

Officer John Parker of the Vernal City Police

DepJrlment drove appellant and her children from the
Health Center to the Division of Family Services (T. at
3 'i- 3 G)

lie

testified that appellan l: continued to re-affirm
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the fact that she had told her daughter not to talk or
cooperate with the police.

She also told her daughter,

who was sitting on her lap, not to talk to the police
and to forget everything she knew (T. at 36).

Officer

Darrell Lance was also in the car and corroborated Officer
Parker's testimony (T. at 44).

As the officers left the

Division of Family Services, appellant yelled, "There goes
your case, suckers.

You haven't got a case, suckers."

at 36, 44, and 64).
Appellant testified as to what she had told
her daughter:
I said, "If they ask you any
questions about Ken (D'Anza), don't
tell them. Tell them you forgot."
I
say_s, "When Mr. Downard came," I says,
"Nhen they came they said that you
could stay with me, and now they are
taking you away from me." So I says
u
f
I
I
they tell you that you can come
back home to mommy, if you tell them
that Ken did all of this stuff
d~n't believe them, because th~y are
l~ers .. Don't tell them nothing unless
mommy ~s there."
(T. at 64).

She also testified:
~ did say, "You suckers, you
blew ~t. You don't have a case."

(T. at 64).
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At the request of appellant's trial counsel, the
court instructed the jury, inter alia, that:
. . the defendant is charged
with the specific offense of witness
tampering, as set forth in these
instructions, and that you should
not allow yourselves to be prejudiced
against her because of any relationship
she may have had with Mr. D'Anza or
by the fact that he has been charged
with an offense.
(Jury Instruction No. 13, R. at 26 and T.at 80).
After deliberation, the jury found appellant
guilty, as charged, of having tampered with a witness in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508, 1953 as amended.
After a pre-sentence investigation was completed, the
court sentenced appellant to a $250.00 fine and a suspended
term of 0 to 5 years in the Utah State Prison with two
years probation (R. at 33,34).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IT WAS NECESSARY AND PROPER IN THIS
CASE FOR THE STATE TO SHOW THE
NATURE OF THE INVESTIGATION WITH
lmiCH APPELLAJ.'JT INTERFERED.
In State v. Renzo, 21 U.2d 205, 443 P.2d 392
(1968), this court noted that:
. discretion on the part of
a trial judge to admit or reject
evidence should not be interfered
with by an ap~ellate court unless
manifest error is shown.
21Sponsored
U.2dby the0t
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In that case, particularly gruesome pictures of a
sexual molestation/murder victim had been admitted

to

establish the depravity element for voluntary manslaughter.
The verdict was affirmed.
Admission of color slides as evidence in a
murder case was also considered in State v. Poe, 21 U.2d 113,
441 P.2d 512 (1968).

'!'his Court stated that;

Initially, it is within the
sound discretion of the trial
court to determine whether the
inflanunatory nature of such slide is
outweighed by their probative
value with respect to fact in issue.
If the latter they may be admitted
eventhough gruesome.
In the instant
case they had no probative value.
All the material facts which could
con~civJ~ly have been adduced from
a viewinc.. of the slides had been
establi!ihed by uncontradicted lax
and medical testimony. The only
purpose was to inflame' and arouse
the jury.
(21 U.2d at 117)

[emphasis added] .

Reading ~and Poe together, it is clear that evidence
which is gruesome or particularly prejudicial may be admitted
when it is probative with respect to a fact in issue and
that f~ct is not shown by other, less gruesome evidence.
The conviction in Poe was reversed, partly because the
only purpose for the evidence complained of was "to inflame
and arouse the jury."
photos

(Id. at 117). 0ther

less gruesome

,demonstrated the very fact which the complained of

photos showed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the instant case, appellant was charged with
a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508, 1953 as

~nded;

A person is guilty of a felony
of the third degree if:
(1) Believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted,
he attempts to influence or otherwise cause a person to:
(a) Testify or
inform falsely: or
(b) Withhold any
testimony, information,
document, or thing:
It was necessary for the state to show that
appellant knew or believed that an official investigation was
pending and also that instructing her daughter to not
testify would interfere.

The information before the

jury in the instant case would have been nonsensical if the
prosecution had omitted any reference to the nature of the
official investigation concerning appellant's daughter.

In

order to make clear that appellant was attempting to
interfere with that investigation by telling her young
daughter to not talk to the police, the prosecution had to
show that the other charge centered upon the little girl's
testimony and that appellant knew it.

Although the

potential for arousing passion and feelings of disgust is
great where sexual abuse of small children is involved, these
cases are also the ones wherein a prosecutor's case must
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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often rely most heavily upon the testimony of young
children.

In order to show that appellant attempted to

interfere with the investigation by withholding her
daughter's testimony, the state had to show the nature
of the investigation.

The purpose of the evidence was not

solely to arouse and inflame the jury as in Poe, supra, but
was, instead necessary to the demonstration of a material
fact, as in Renzo, supra.
Appellant specifically complained of the
test~ony

of one of the police officers wherein he noted what

the little girl had told him concerning the sexual abuse
(Appellant's brief at p. 9, T. at 19).

This statement of the

child, made in her mother's presence and at her mother's
urging, showed the fact

tha~

the mother clearly knew that

an investigation for abuse of her daughter was likely and
that her daughter's testimony would go directly to
establishing a case against Mr. D'Anza.

Although other

evidence in this case may have shown that appellant knew of
the forcible sodoQy charge, this evidence alone clearly
showed that appellant understood

what her daughter's

testimony would be and how important it was to the
state's case.
The additional cases cited by appellant can be
distinguished and arc not determinativ~ of this matter.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Oxedine v. State, Okl. 335 P.2d 940 (~,:Mn~~
as in Poe, supra, gruesome photographs were
they had no probative value but served only to inflame
arouse the jury.

In this case, the complained of evideDpe

formed an essential part of the state's case and could not
been omitted.
State v. Amundson, 37 Wash. 2d. 356, 223 P.2d

1067 (1950), was an indecent assault case.

In that case,

the evidence complained of was a statement by a witness
connecting the defendant with other, unrelated sex crimes
without showing that the defendant had been convicted for
those crimes.

In the instant case, the evidence is of a

substantially different nature.

It did not indicate

that appellant may have committed other crimes similar to,
but unconnected with the instant charge.
evidence shed light

In this case, the

upon the nature of this charge.

It

explained the circumstances surrounding the very crime with
which appellant was charged.

In Amundson, the court noted:

To stress this alleged act of
misconduct (which had no logical
connection with the crime charged)
constituted prejudicial error and
entitled appellant to a new trial.
Id. at 1069,

(paranthetical in original).

In the instant case, the evidence was logically and
inseparably connected with the state's case.

Appellant's

atturn0y states that "defendant Danker was painted as a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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baYe

person who defended a man accused of abusing her own
daughter."

(Appellant's brief at pp. 8-9).

While he may

be correct, the effect of appellant's crime in this case was
to do just that.

It was impossible for the state to prove

its case and hide that fact from the jury.

Prejudicial

evidence should be excluded when it has nothing to do with
the charge at hand.

But when, as in this case, the

evidence goes to the very charge before the jury and
explains the circumstances and crime to be considered by the
jury it should n9t be excluded.

Respondent urges this

Court to affirm the judgment and conviction of the lower
court.
CONCLUSION
When other evidence is available or has been
presented to demonstrate the same facts soughL to be
shown by evidence which is highly prejudicial and inflammatory by nature, the prejudicial evidence should not
be admitted.

In such a case, the only purpose for the

evidence would be to arouse and impassion the jury.

However,

in this case, the co~plained of evidence was a necessary and
integral part of the state's case.
as a whole would

Without it, the evidence

have been unclear.

have understood the charqe.

The jury could not

Moreover, the prejudicial aspect
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stemmed not so much from the evidence itself as from
what it demonstrated about the nature of this case.

There

was no error, the verdict and sentence should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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